Lt Gen Sahni: Bangladeshis alone deserve credit for country’s independence
In this exclusive interview conducted by Ayanangsha Maitra for Dhaka Tribune for its Victory Day supplement, Lt Gen Arun Kumar Sahni, former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the South-Western Command of the Indian Army, talks about India’s role in the Liberation War of 1971, the possibility of an apology from Pakistan and Bangladesh’s geopolitical importance
Former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the South-Western Command of the Indian Army, Lt Gen Arun Kumar Sahni. Photo: Collected
Ayanangsha Maitra
Publish : 16 Dec 2023, 10:00 AMUpdate : 18 Dec 2023, 11:47 AM
How would you look at the role of the Indian Army in 1971?
At the outset, I may state that the independence of Bangladesh was and will continue to be attributed to the sacrifices, determination and grit of the people of Bangladesh. It is they and they alone who deserve the credit for the independence of Bangladesh. Yes, India could not bear the atrocities and genocide perpetrated on the people of Bangladesh and responded positively to the clarion call given by the aggrieved local Bangalis and used all the instruments of national power to assist the government in exile and support the armed resistance movement.
It is in this context that the Indian Army took on the mandate of training the resistance movement that motivated local Bangalis who wanted to seek revenge on the Pakistan Army. The Indian Army not only trained the Mukti Bahini but organized it into an efficient guerrilla force. Selected Indian army officers and men thereafter fought with them, under their colours, to literally give what we in the army language call on-the-job training. The Mukti Bahini also became the eyes and ears for the military operations launched by the Indian Army to liberate erstwhile East Pakistan and carried out “fifth column” operations in support of the offensive, as per a planned design.
The Indian Army launched a multipronged offensive to liberate the country. The Air Force decimated Pakistan's air power in the initial few hours of the offensive. The naval blockade, in conjunction with the land offensive, ensured that the Pakistan Army had no option but to surrender. It is to the credit of the Indian Army that in spite of heavy casualties, even in the worst of situations it retained equanimity and conducted itself within the bounds of morality and ethics expected of soldiers. It also protected the Pakistani armed forces and senior military-civilian bureaucracy which had surrendered from the vengeance of the locals, who had really suffered under their tyranny. The magnitude of the victory of the Indian Army can be gauged by the fact that it led to the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers, the largest surrender of any armed forces after World War Two. A significant event was that the Indian Armed Forces were prepared to take on the powerful US Seventh Fleet that had threatened India to stop the war and set Pakistani soldiers free to escape back to West Pakistan.
It thereafter ensured peace and stability in the newly formed country of Bangladesh, till the government of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took charge. It is also again unparalleled in history that a victorious army and country handed over charge to a newly formed government, within weeks of its becoming independent and without any imposition. The army assisted in the repatriation of refugees from India back to their homeland and provided them with essential food and medical supplies.
What advantage(s) did the Indian Army have? Was topography in favour of India? Did Pakistan make a strategic miscalculation?
There are three geographical realities of which the first two were advantages and the last one was an impediment to the Indian Army. Firstly, erstwhile East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, is surrounded by the Indian state on its land frontiers and only has the Indian Ocean to its south. Secondly, the initial formation of Pakistan in two spatially separated landmasses–one to the west of India and the other in the centre of Eastern India–gave an advantage to isolate the two regions for undertaking operations in any one. The distance denied Pakistan the synergy of its combat resources. Thirdly, the riverine terrain and the road infrastructure did not permit cross-country movement in most places, which led to higher casualties on the attacker, ie, the Indian Army. It had to break the initial defensive deployment of the Pakistan Army in today’s Bangladesh by near frontal attacks.
The geography of East Pakistan allowed the Indian Army to undertake a multi-pronged offensive. It simultaneously launched three separate offensives from the east, west and north. The meagre air resources available to the adversary were destroyed in the first few hours, allowing our Air Force to attack Pakistani forces with impunity. The Navy imposed a naval blockade from the sea. Thus, the Pakistani forces were isolated in this sector, with no replenishment of war-waging materials/supplies from West Pakistan.
The multi-directional attack forced the adversary to redistribute its combat resources on all fronts concurrently. It also forced a decision dilemma on the use of its reserves, as the Indian Army continued to progress successfully on all its offensive thrusts. The breaking point was Heliborne operations that were undertaken after the first few days, which took the Indian Army to the portals of the capital Dhaka. It was once again only after the Second World War that an innovative propaganda campaign carried out by the Indian Army led to the early surrender of Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistani soldiers, as they kept retreating towards the capital Dhaka, were also stressed by the likely vengeance and wrath they would face from the Mukti Bahini for their atrocities. It also contributed to their eventual surrender.
Was it a strategic miscalculation? Yes and no. Yes, for they did not expect such a robust response from the Indian state. Also, after the military engagements of 1962 and 1965, they had convinced themselves of their superiority over the Indian Army. They also felt that the support of the US would not let them be dismembered. These were miscalculations for sure. And no, because the chain of events after their general election and the mandate in favour of a political party from East Pakistan led to the military subjugation of Bangalis. The atrocities and ruthless savagery had created a wedge between the people from these two parts of Pakistan and would have led to an eventual change.
Could you briefly elucidate how the Indian Army trained the Mukti Bahini and guerilla fighters?
Guerrilla warfare in the beginning requires mandatory training in basic soldierly skills. This means the individual has to be physically strong and conditioned, learn and gain proficiency in basic tactical skills of operating with stealth and safely in small numbers, unarmed combat, etc and finally in the use of soldierly aids like personal weapons – rifle, pistol, automatics, grenades and bayonet fighting for an eventuality of hand to hand engagement. Thereafter, methods to communicate with communication equipment or through day and night field signals and fundamentals of camouflage and concealment are also imparted to guerrillas.
This training requires anything up to three months of basic structured training.
Along with this, the individual has to learn and operate in small teams and gain knowledge of the enemy’s tactics. Thereafter, specialized skills of setting up ambush, stalking the enemy, use of explosives and mines, medical first aid, basic medical support actions, etc are taught.
After basic training, to hone the newly trained guerrilla fighter, he is put through - what in army terms is called on-the-job training. This is for a minimum of three to four weeks. During this, he is employed with trained professionals in mock tactical operations and thereafter exposed to the real thing with trained and experienced soldiers. A small team in guerrilla operations can comprise from two to three persons to about six to eight members.
The Indian Army carried this out in small camps in proximity to the borders and also participated jointly in actual guerrilla operations with the Mukti Bahini as part of on-the-job training. Some selected Mukti Bahini members were also put through formal army weapon and tactical courses at the Indian Army’s training establishments. These then became team leaders and tenanted senior leadership roles in the guerrilla force.
The US supported Pakistan and sent it arms. How would you describe Russia's support in the Liberation War?
Indira Gandhi as prime minister of India has to be given credit for her vision and sagacity in setting the stage for the launch of military operations in Bangladesh to liberate the country from the shackles of the Pakistan Army. Towards this, one of the greatest contributors to giving us the moral courage to undertake this operation, in spite of threats and warnings conveyed by the US, was the conclusion and signing of an Indo-Soviet security treaty, signed in the middle of 1971 and being applicable for 20 years. With the provision to be renewed on mutual consent, which, of course, was done subsequently.
Also, as you are aware, the Pakistan Army created a second front for India by launching operations from West Pakistan. This was to force India to divert its combat resources and attention from East Pakistan and hence stop the capitulation of its forces in that sector. The second front did delay the operations in the eastern sector, the erstwhile East Pakistan, but with the assistance of Russia, the erstwhile Soviet Union, India got the time it needed to reach its aim of liberation of Bangladesh.
The UN Security Council had moved a proposal which indicted India for having undertaken the offensive which internationally had been justified due to the deluge of refugees and a proactive foreign policy campaign by the Indian state. However, the US insistence on an immediate cessation of hostilities would have left the aim of liberating Bangladesh incomplete. The Soviet Union insisted and delayed any such resolution by the UN Security Council and thus gave India the time to carry out its operations. It also needs to be acknowledged that it was the backing of the Soviet Union and its orders to move its own submarines/carrier group towards the Indian Ocean/Bay of Bengal, which countervailed the threat posed by the US Seventh Fleet, that was the sword of Damocles on India, to stop operations immediately. Russian veto came once again to the assistance of India to ensure that Bangladesh was liberated.
Has General Headquarters Rawalpindi evolved and modernized the Pakistan Army in a great way? How would you comment on the Pakistan Army's budget, recent acquisition and worsening economy?
A response to this question is indeed complex and would take a lot of time. However, a quick reply would be captured by the famous saying that in the case of the Pakistan Army/deep state, it has a country at its behest, and not that Pakistan has an army. This implies that the penetration of the Pakistan Armed Forces/GHQ is indeed complete in the institution of Pakistan.
The Pakistan Army with quasi-military governmental organizations controls most of the economic activity within the country. It also appoints military leaders for various civil/public enterprises and has de-facto control. Thus, there is no shortage of funds faced by the Pakistan Armed Forces for equipping and to meet the requirements of weapons and warlike stores. However, its engagement and involvement in activities other than military, eg financial/economic activities, trying to play games with the US and China, and trying to control the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, leads to a diversion of focus from military training and functioning.
The Pakistan Armed Forces would be appropriately equipped, but the current state of the economy is having an impact on their operational effectiveness. The Pakistan Army’s commitment to internal security, involvement in the political turmoil and machinations within the country, the senior military leadership’s engagement in matters other than military, and the problems on its western borders with the Taliban in Afghanistan are all likely to have a detrimental impact on its combat capability.
There is no doubt that Pakistan’s economy is in a tailspin. Its fundamentals are too weak and will continue to force it to live on the largesse of its friends – Saudi Arabia or China – and by seeking support from international agencies like the IMF and World Bank. In the long term, it will impact the capabilities of the Pakistan Army to look at a limited confrontation with India.
Do you think Pakistan’s future leadership will apologize to Bangladesh for the 1971 massacre and genocide?
It is morally the right thing to do. But I do not think the current dispensation and the state of political and economic turmoil in Pakistan will see this happening in the near or mid-term. There is no doubt that the atrocities on Bangalis by Pakistan’s military and its establishment, in the events preceding the liberation of Bangladesh, from March 1971, were indeed shameful and warrant an apology by the Pakistan leadership.
The Bangladesh Army is on its way to achieving Forces Goal 2030. What would you say about its strength and operational capability?
As a senior military leader, I can say with confidence that the Bangladesh Army has matured and is capable of meeting the mandate that is set by its political leadership. I have had the pleasure of doing courses with some of the erstwhile senior military leaders of Bangladesh in India, and I can say with surety that they are professionally extremely competent and have the necessary balance required to meet their national vision and goals.
Military personnel from the Bangladesh Armed Forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions have performed with aplomb and have shown their mettle in tricky and complex situations.
How can defence cooperation be strengthened between the two neighbours? How can Bangladesh contribute more to regional security?
Defence engagement between the two neighbouring armed forces commenced sometime back with bilateral exercises for counter-terrorist and HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) situations. There are regular exchange visits, and officers train at each other’s training establishments at the tactical and operational levels.
Formal forums have been established and are functioning. There is the India-Bangladesh Annual Defence Dialogue, held between India’s defence secretary and the principal staff officer of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. The fourth edition of the talks took place in the latter half of 2022. Also, the second edition of India-Bangladesh Tri-services Staff Talks (TSST) concluded last year. The latter is to give shape to engagements under a bilateral defence cooperation mechanism for all three services and further strengthen bilateral defence engagements. It is a forum to strengthen regular talks at the strategic and operational levels between the Integrated Defence Staff headquarters and Bangladesh’s Armed Forces Division.
Towards capability development, India has extended a $500 million line of credit for defence goods.
The India-Bangladesh security and border management got a fillip in 2015 with the ratification of the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement. In addition, there are other bilateral agreements addressing security cooperation, including the Coordinated Border Management Plan signed in 2011.
It would be a fair assessment that this golden era in bilateral relations has solidified military-to-military ties. This augurs well for the stability of the subcontinent.
How do you look at the rise of Bangladesh? Could you please share with us the geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic interests of this riverine nation?
Bangladesh, due to its geography, will be an important player in the emerging geo-political and geo-strategic landscape. It is indeed heartening to see the economic and social development in the country, which augurs well for India and South Asia at large. There is no doubt that it will play a pivotal role in the emerging polycentric world order. A few quick points:
Bangladesh has ensured its financial and social security with a very innovative and indigenous approach. The current political regime has ensured that it balances its relations with both China and India with maturity and without antagonism. Its pre-eminent position in the Bay of Bengal is again being handled with great responsibility to ensure that the Indian Ocean does not become militarized. It is forward-looking and once again at the forefront of leading the fight against the onslaught of climate change. It will be at the frontline for tackling its negative impact in the coming decades. Therefore, plans towards mitigation and adaptation, which have been formulated in the Delta Plan 2100 and Mujib Plan 2030, are indeed laudatory and pathbreaking.
It is irrefutable that the growth and stability of the nations of South Asia are intrinsically linked to each other’s internal stability, social cohesion, and financial and economic well-being. Towards this, the development of Bangladesh and its warm relations with India have given the necessary impetus to regional groupings like Bimstec and BBIN. The extension of its port facilities to both the landlocked South Asian neighbours of Nepal and Bhutan and additional options to India increases the communication linkages towards Southeast Asia, which will facilitate greater integration with Southeast Asian economies.
I conclude on a heartening note that the positive state of India-Bangladesh relations is the right example to follow, where while meeting internal challenges there is a need to meet the external responsibilities with equanimity.