Bangladesh Defense
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Urgent need to plan against 3-front threats
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronti
Urgent need to plan against 3-front threats
India faces risks on its borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. The fact that the fronts represent three different types of threat increases the complexity in strategic thinking
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)
Updated on:
08 Jul 2025, 12:30 am
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronting an active and complex threat environment on three distinct fronts. Each adversary—Pakistan, China and potentially Bangladesh—presents a unique security challenge demanding entirely different response spectrums.
Bangladesh is really not an adversary yet. But in view of the current dynamics in bilateral relations, it’s fair enough to consider threat options from that direction too. Together, this creates a continuous arc of strategic tension along India’s western, northern and eastern borders. Managing this tri-junction of pressure calls not just for better resource optimisation, but for a complete review of how India perceives threats, including those in concert, in the near future.
In the case of Pakistan, it’s all about hybrid war under a conventional and nuclear umbrella. The conventional military equation remains in India’s favour, but the role of Pakistan’s military remains dangerous because of its historic irrationality, an offensive nuclear posture and the continued patronage of radical non-state actors. The terrain here is a complicated mosaic—high-altitude battle zones in J&K, riverine and canal obstacle systems in Punjab, and deserts in Rajasthan.
While Pakistan’s army remains a professional conventional force, its real warfighting doctrine continues to be hybrid in nature. Radical proxies, extremist ideological mobilisation, information operations, cyber warfare, and cross-border terrorism remain the preferred instruments. Despite the recent failings in West Asia in the domain of hybrid conflict, Pakistan is likely to persist with its more refined and technologically proficient versions.
Importantly, Pakistan is also increasingly reliant on air and missile deterrence. The emphasis appears to be on counterbalancing India’s emerging air dominance and growing missile strike capabilities. Pakistan’s strategy also appears designed to pose limited but credible offensive threats— particularly to ensure India keeps its reserve formations committed in the proximity of the western theatre, creating the inevitable decision dilemma about insufficient reserves for the northern borders.
The northern border with China presents a different class of threats—of intimidation, strategic distraction and geopolitical messaging, rather than imminent all-out war. Unlike Pakistan, China does not rely on proxies. It employs a calibrated strategy of grey-zone operations—transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), military infrastructure buildup, psychological warfare and diplomatic signalling.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is technologically far more advanced, better funded and integrated. But it’s untested in modern conflict. Its preference has been to maintain controlled tensions along the LAC without triggering full-scale war. From Galwan to Yangtze, the PLA has sought political dividends from military standoffs while keeping escalation tightly managed. Missile exchanges, cyber intrusions, isolated special forces engagements, and forward base upgrades are more likely PLA scenarios than a full-frontal assault.
The strategy comes at a steep cost for us. India must commit significant, high-quality troops year-round to Ladakh, Arunachal and Sikkim, often dual-tasked with other roles. This stretches human endurance, operational readiness, and logistics in some of the world’s harshest terrains. The application of pressure on the Himalayan borders is designed to divert focus from maritime aspirations that China has in the Indian Ocean, where its freedom of operation is linked to its export-led growth story.
The third front is perhaps the least expected. Bangladesh, until recently a dependable— if delicate—partner, has now become a strategic question mark. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the rise of a radicalised political ecosystem marked by Jamaate-Islami’s resurgence, has changed the character of Dhaka’s policy orientation.
At a purely military level, Bangladesh is not in the same league as Pakistan or China. Yet, its nine-division army has strategic utility for India’s adversaries. A hostile or neutral Bangladesh creates two immediate problems for India. First, it makes the Siliguri Corridor more vulnerable than ever. Just the threat of disruption in this 22-km wide corridor is enough to force us to keep disproportionate reserves here.
Second, it could facilitate the rekindling of dormant insurgencies in the Northeast. Bangladesh could become a permissive environment for insurgents, facilitate illegal cross-border movement of people and arms, and undertake psychological operations aimed at destabilising sensitive frontier states like Assam, Manipur and Tripura.
India’s problem is not just that it faces threats on three fronts—it is that these fronts represent three different types of threats. One is a hybrid ideological-proxy threat with conventional overtones (Pakistan), the second, a grey-zone standoff with a technological superpower (China), and the third, a hybridpolitical challenge with potential for escalation of militancy in our vulnerable Northeast (Bangladesh). Greater force flexibility will be needed. Military formations should be able to switch theatres based on scenarios. Rapid reaction formations, especially for the eastern theatre, would be a boon.
Managing strategic reserves would need prudent pre-positioning. Instead of static reserves waiting to be called upon, we would need agile force packages that can airlift, rail-shift or road-redeploy at short notice. Warfighting doctrines may need customisation. For example, responding to Chinese intrusions with excessive concentration is unnecessary and potentially escalatory. Likewise, overcommitting to the Bangladesh border may dilute posture on the more potent fronts. Precision, speed, and jointness—not sheer numbers—should define the response. There is no inkling yet where the theatre command system rests.
The central and state armed police forces must be integrated for hybrid warfare response models. These forces may be required to deal with insurgency support or street-level political disorder that falls below the military’s engagement threshold.
Pakistan’s ISI, China’s PLA Strategic Support Force, and radical groups in Bangladesh may not coordinate with each other formally—but the effect of their actions could be synchronised unintentionally. India’s intelligence set-up has over the years become far more integrated. We must have a threat picture that considers second and third-order linkages between seemingly unrelated developments. The age of the single-front war is over. India’s strategic planners must accept this stark reality and plan accordingly. Each border presents a separate category of challenge, and all three could operate simultaneously with different objectives and thresholds of escalation. Understanding and accepting this is half the battle.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
India faces risks on its borders with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh. The fact that the fronts represent three different types of threat increases the complexity in strategic thinking
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)
Updated on:
08 Jul 2025, 12:30 am
The public has often heard of the two-front threat to India’s border security. However, for the first time in recent history, the country finds itself confronting an active and complex threat environment on three distinct fronts. Each adversary—Pakistan, China and potentially Bangladesh—presents a unique security challenge demanding entirely different response spectrums.
Bangladesh is really not an adversary yet. But in view of the current dynamics in bilateral relations, it’s fair enough to consider threat options from that direction too. Together, this creates a continuous arc of strategic tension along India’s western, northern and eastern borders. Managing this tri-junction of pressure calls not just for better resource optimisation, but for a complete review of how India perceives threats, including those in concert, in the near future.
In the case of Pakistan, it’s all about hybrid war under a conventional and nuclear umbrella. The conventional military equation remains in India’s favour, but the role of Pakistan’s military remains dangerous because of its historic irrationality, an offensive nuclear posture and the continued patronage of radical non-state actors. The terrain here is a complicated mosaic—high-altitude battle zones in J&K, riverine and canal obstacle systems in Punjab, and deserts in Rajasthan.
While Pakistan’s army remains a professional conventional force, its real warfighting doctrine continues to be hybrid in nature. Radical proxies, extremist ideological mobilisation, information operations, cyber warfare, and cross-border terrorism remain the preferred instruments. Despite the recent failings in West Asia in the domain of hybrid conflict, Pakistan is likely to persist with its more refined and technologically proficient versions.
Importantly, Pakistan is also increasingly reliant on air and missile deterrence. The emphasis appears to be on counterbalancing India’s emerging air dominance and growing missile strike capabilities. Pakistan’s strategy also appears designed to pose limited but credible offensive threats— particularly to ensure India keeps its reserve formations committed in the proximity of the western theatre, creating the inevitable decision dilemma about insufficient reserves for the northern borders.
The northern border with China presents a different class of threats—of intimidation, strategic distraction and geopolitical messaging, rather than imminent all-out war. Unlike Pakistan, China does not rely on proxies. It employs a calibrated strategy of grey-zone operations—transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), military infrastructure buildup, psychological warfare and diplomatic signalling.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is technologically far more advanced, better funded and integrated. But it’s untested in modern conflict. Its preference has been to maintain controlled tensions along the LAC without triggering full-scale war. From Galwan to Yangtze, the PLA has sought political dividends from military standoffs while keeping escalation tightly managed. Missile exchanges, cyber intrusions, isolated special forces engagements, and forward base upgrades are more likely PLA scenarios than a full-frontal assault.
The strategy comes at a steep cost for us. India must commit significant, high-quality troops year-round to Ladakh, Arunachal and Sikkim, often dual-tasked with other roles. This stretches human endurance, operational readiness, and logistics in some of the world’s harshest terrains. The application of pressure on the Himalayan borders is designed to divert focus from maritime aspirations that China has in the Indian Ocean, where its freedom of operation is linked to its export-led growth story.
The third front is perhaps the least expected. Bangladesh, until recently a dependable— if delicate—partner, has now become a strategic question mark. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government and the rise of a radicalised political ecosystem marked by Jamaate-Islami’s resurgence, has changed the character of Dhaka’s policy orientation.
At a purely military level, Bangladesh is not in the same league as Pakistan or China. Yet, its nine-division army has strategic utility for India’s adversaries. A hostile or neutral Bangladesh creates two immediate problems for India. First, it makes the Siliguri Corridor more vulnerable than ever. Just the threat of disruption in this 22-km wide corridor is enough to force us to keep disproportionate reserves here.
Second, it could facilitate the rekindling of dormant insurgencies in the Northeast. Bangladesh could become a permissive environment for insurgents, facilitate illegal cross-border movement of people and arms, and undertake psychological operations aimed at destabilising sensitive frontier states like Assam, Manipur and Tripura.
India’s problem is not just that it faces threats on three fronts—it is that these fronts represent three different types of threats. One is a hybrid ideological-proxy threat with conventional overtones (Pakistan), the second, a grey-zone standoff with a technological superpower (China), and the third, a hybridpolitical challenge with potential for escalation of militancy in our vulnerable Northeast (Bangladesh). Greater force flexibility will be needed. Military formations should be able to switch theatres based on scenarios. Rapid reaction formations, especially for the eastern theatre, would be a boon.
Managing strategic reserves would need prudent pre-positioning. Instead of static reserves waiting to be called upon, we would need agile force packages that can airlift, rail-shift or road-redeploy at short notice. Warfighting doctrines may need customisation. For example, responding to Chinese intrusions with excessive concentration is unnecessary and potentially escalatory. Likewise, overcommitting to the Bangladesh border may dilute posture on the more potent fronts. Precision, speed, and jointness—not sheer numbers—should define the response. There is no inkling yet where the theatre command system rests.
The central and state armed police forces must be integrated for hybrid warfare response models. These forces may be required to deal with insurgency support or street-level political disorder that falls below the military’s engagement threshold.
Pakistan’s ISI, China’s PLA Strategic Support Force, and radical groups in Bangladesh may not coordinate with each other formally—but the effect of their actions could be synchronised unintentionally. India’s intelligence set-up has over the years become far more integrated. We must have a threat picture that considers second and third-order linkages between seemingly unrelated developments. The age of the single-front war is over. India’s strategic planners must accept this stark reality and plan accordingly. Each border presents a separate category of challenge, and all three could operate simultaneously with different objectives and thresholds of escalation. Understanding and accepting this is half the battle.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
