Pakistan Defense Forum
- Jan 25, 2024
- 111,083
- 353
The Plutonium route to the bomb
A.Q. Khan always wanted Pakistan to work only on Uranium weapon as compared to Plutonium because (he thought and tried to convince Gen Zia) Plutonium route involved highly complex and sophisticated procedures and processes but PAEC knew better. Plutonium route and all the related activities to establish infrastructure (for eventual bomb) continued in full swing against AQ Khan desire. A.Q. Khan sought to undermine Munir Khan by opposing the plutonium route because Munir was a plutonium expert, having spent 14 years as Head of Reactor Engineering at the IAEA before his joining PAEC in 1972, where PAEC under Munir Khan not only initiated the Kahuta Enrichment project before AQK, but continued to give crucial technical support.
Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the plutonium route to the bomb, and pursued it along with the uranium route. Whether by intention to prepare a “nuclear option” or not, decisions made in the 1960s already provided a valuable basis for establishing a weapons programme. In 1971 the Canadian General Electric Co. completed a 137 MW (electrical) CANDU power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), which went critical in August 1971 and inaugurated by the man who would go on to become the architect of Nuclear Pakistan, the new Chairman, PAEC, Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan. It began commercial operation in October 1972. CGEC also provided a small heavy water production facility. These facilities had been contracted for in the mid-60s, thus predating Bhutto's drive for nuclear weapon capability, but perhaps influenced by him in a ministerial capacity. The technology for KANUPP was the same natural uranium/heavy water technology used in the Indian Cirus and later Dhruva reactors used by India for producing weapons plutonium. The facilities were under IAEA safeguards, and have remained so; nonetheless it was the initial intent of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme to use plutonium from this reactor as the key ingredient in their nuclear arsenal. But to do that Pakistan required a means of separating plutonium from spent fuel. Some advance preparation had occurred here also. In the late 1960s Pakistan had contracted with both British Nuclear Fuels Limited and Belgonucléaire to prepare studies and designs for pilot plutonium separation facilities. The BNFL design, capable of separating up 360 g of fuel a year. The plan for this plant was completed by 1971.
The centrepiece of the PAEC weapon's programme at this time was the effort to acquire a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from the fuel of KANUPP. The first step after Multan was to build a pilot reprocessing facility called the “New Labs” at PINSTECH, which was completed by 1981, and work on the KHUSHAB Plutonium production reactor started in the 1980s and it became operational in the 1990s. This facility (New Labs) was a larger and more ambitious project than the original BNFL plan. Belgonucléaire and the French corporation Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) built it in the early 70s.
The pilot plant was followed by a contract signed with SGN in March 1973 to prepare the basic design for a large-scale reprocessing plant, one with a capacity of 100 tons of fuel per year, considerably more than KANUPP would generate. SGN was the world's chief exporter of reprocessing technology and had previously built military plutonium facilities for France, the secret plutonium plant at Dimona in Israel, and contracted to provide similar plants to Taiwan, South Korea, and (later) Iraq. The Chashma plant, as it was known, would have the capability to produce 200 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, if sufficient fuel were available to feed it. It would have provided Pakistan with the ability to “break safeguards” and quickly process accumulated fuel from KANUPP when it decided to openly declare itself a nuclear-armed state. One for the final detailed design and construction on October 18, 1974 followed the initial design contract. The original contract for this project did not include significant safeguards to discourage diversion of the separated plutonium, or controls on the technology
India's first nuclear test, known variously as “Smiling Buddha”, the PNE (for “Peaceful Nuclear Explosive”), and most recently Pokhran-I, occurred on May 18 , 1974. It provided an additional stimulus to the Pakistani weapons programme. Bhutto increased the funding for the programme after the Indian test, but since arrangements to secure lavish funding had been underway for more than a year this would have occurred anyway. One consequence of the test was ironically to hamper Pakistan's programme as the test sharply escalated international attention to proliferation and led to increased restrictions on nuclear exports to all nations, not just India.
The French government began to show increased concern about the Chashma plant during 1976. A safeguards agreement for France brought the plant before the IAEA in February 1976, which was approved on March 18 and signed by Pakistan. This at least ensured that the plant would have monitoring so that diversion to military purposes could be made with impunity. Despite Bhutto's overthrow in 1977 by General Zia, the latter continued the project unabated, and continued to press the French to fulfil the Chashma contract. But France had begun gradually turning against the reprocessing plant. In late 1977 the French proposed to Pakistan to alter the design of the plant so that it would produce a mixture of uranium and plutonium rather pure plutonium. This modification would not affect the plant's suitability for its declared purpose - producing mixed oxide fuel for power reactors - but would prevent its direct use for producing plutonium for weapons. Pakistan refused to accept the modification. But by that time Pakistan had received 95 percent of the detailed plans for the plant by SGN, and was thus in a position to secure components and build the plant itself, which it would later at KHUSHAB.
A.Q. Khan always wanted Pakistan to work only on Uranium weapon as compared to Plutonium because (he thought and tried to convince Gen Zia) Plutonium route involved highly complex and sophisticated procedures and processes but PAEC knew better. Plutonium route and all the related activities to establish infrastructure (for eventual bomb) continued in full swing against AQ Khan desire. A.Q. Khan sought to undermine Munir Khan by opposing the plutonium route because Munir was a plutonium expert, having spent 14 years as Head of Reactor Engineering at the IAEA before his joining PAEC in 1972, where PAEC under Munir Khan not only initiated the Kahuta Enrichment project before AQK, but continued to give crucial technical support.
Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the plutonium route to the bomb, and pursued it along with the uranium route. Whether by intention to prepare a “nuclear option” or not, decisions made in the 1960s already provided a valuable basis for establishing a weapons programme. In 1971 the Canadian General Electric Co. completed a 137 MW (electrical) CANDU power reactor for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), which went critical in August 1971 and inaugurated by the man who would go on to become the architect of Nuclear Pakistan, the new Chairman, PAEC, Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan. It began commercial operation in October 1972. CGEC also provided a small heavy water production facility. These facilities had been contracted for in the mid-60s, thus predating Bhutto's drive for nuclear weapon capability, but perhaps influenced by him in a ministerial capacity. The technology for KANUPP was the same natural uranium/heavy water technology used in the Indian Cirus and later Dhruva reactors used by India for producing weapons plutonium. The facilities were under IAEA safeguards, and have remained so; nonetheless it was the initial intent of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme to use plutonium from this reactor as the key ingredient in their nuclear arsenal. But to do that Pakistan required a means of separating plutonium from spent fuel. Some advance preparation had occurred here also. In the late 1960s Pakistan had contracted with both British Nuclear Fuels Limited and Belgonucléaire to prepare studies and designs for pilot plutonium separation facilities. The BNFL design, capable of separating up 360 g of fuel a year. The plan for this plant was completed by 1971.
The centrepiece of the PAEC weapon's programme at this time was the effort to acquire a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from the fuel of KANUPP. The first step after Multan was to build a pilot reprocessing facility called the “New Labs” at PINSTECH, which was completed by 1981, and work on the KHUSHAB Plutonium production reactor started in the 1980s and it became operational in the 1990s. This facility (New Labs) was a larger and more ambitious project than the original BNFL plan. Belgonucléaire and the French corporation Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) built it in the early 70s.
The pilot plant was followed by a contract signed with SGN in March 1973 to prepare the basic design for a large-scale reprocessing plant, one with a capacity of 100 tons of fuel per year, considerably more than KANUPP would generate. SGN was the world's chief exporter of reprocessing technology and had previously built military plutonium facilities for France, the secret plutonium plant at Dimona in Israel, and contracted to provide similar plants to Taiwan, South Korea, and (later) Iraq. The Chashma plant, as it was known, would have the capability to produce 200 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, if sufficient fuel were available to feed it. It would have provided Pakistan with the ability to “break safeguards” and quickly process accumulated fuel from KANUPP when it decided to openly declare itself a nuclear-armed state. One for the final detailed design and construction on October 18, 1974 followed the initial design contract. The original contract for this project did not include significant safeguards to discourage diversion of the separated plutonium, or controls on the technology
India's first nuclear test, known variously as “Smiling Buddha”, the PNE (for “Peaceful Nuclear Explosive”), and most recently Pokhran-I, occurred on May 18 , 1974. It provided an additional stimulus to the Pakistani weapons programme. Bhutto increased the funding for the programme after the Indian test, but since arrangements to secure lavish funding had been underway for more than a year this would have occurred anyway. One consequence of the test was ironically to hamper Pakistan's programme as the test sharply escalated international attention to proliferation and led to increased restrictions on nuclear exports to all nations, not just India.
The French government began to show increased concern about the Chashma plant during 1976. A safeguards agreement for France brought the plant before the IAEA in February 1976, which was approved on March 18 and signed by Pakistan. This at least ensured that the plant would have monitoring so that diversion to military purposes could be made with impunity. Despite Bhutto's overthrow in 1977 by General Zia, the latter continued the project unabated, and continued to press the French to fulfil the Chashma contract. But France had begun gradually turning against the reprocessing plant. In late 1977 the French proposed to Pakistan to alter the design of the plant so that it would produce a mixture of uranium and plutonium rather pure plutonium. This modification would not affect the plant's suitability for its declared purpose - producing mixed oxide fuel for power reactors - but would prevent its direct use for producing plutonium for weapons. Pakistan refused to accept the modification. But by that time Pakistan had received 95 percent of the detailed plans for the plant by SGN, and was thus in a position to secure components and build the plant itself, which it would later at KHUSHAB.
