- Jan 26, 2024
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Twitter released an archive of over ten million tweets posted and over nine million tweets were attributable to 3,800 accounts affiliated with the Internet Research Agency or Russia's infamous St. Petersburg troll factory. Over one million tweets were attributable to 770 accounts, originating from Iran.
Seven important points to know about the Russian and Iranian troll farm operations.
1. All Content Points Home
2. Multiple Goals
3. Community Targeting
4. Equal-Opportunity Troll Farms
5. Opportunism
6. Evolution
7. Low Impact
The Russian and Iranian troll farm operations show that American society was deeply vulnerable, not to all troll farm operations, but to troll accounts of a particular type. That type hid behind carefully crafted personalities, produced original and engaging content, infiltrated activist and engaged communities, and posted in hyper-partisan, polarizing terms.
Content spread from the troll farm accounts was designed to capitalize on, and corrupt, genuine political activism. The trolls encapsulated the twin challenges of online anonymity — since they were able to operate under false personas — and online "filter bubbles," using positive feedback loops to make their audiences ever more radical.
The positive conclusion of this is that the trolls were less effective than may have been feared. Many achieved little or no impact, and their operations were washed away in the firehose of Twitter. The negative conclusion is that the most effective Russian trolls used exactly the techniques which drive genuine online activism and engagement. That made it much harder to separate them out from genuine users. It will continue to do so.
Identifying future foreign influence operations, and reducing their impact, will demand awareness and resilience from the activist communities targeted, not just the platforms and the open source community.
Seven important points to know about the Russian and Iranian troll farm operations.
1. All Content Points Home
2. Multiple Goals
3. Community Targeting
4. Equal-Opportunity Troll Farms
5. Opportunism
6. Evolution
7. Low Impact
The Russian and Iranian troll farm operations show that American society was deeply vulnerable, not to all troll farm operations, but to troll accounts of a particular type. That type hid behind carefully crafted personalities, produced original and engaging content, infiltrated activist and engaged communities, and posted in hyper-partisan, polarizing terms.
Content spread from the troll farm accounts was designed to capitalize on, and corrupt, genuine political activism. The trolls encapsulated the twin challenges of online anonymity — since they were able to operate under false personas — and online "filter bubbles," using positive feedback loops to make their audiences ever more radical.
The positive conclusion of this is that the trolls were less effective than may have been feared. Many achieved little or no impact, and their operations were washed away in the firehose of Twitter. The negative conclusion is that the most effective Russian trolls used exactly the techniques which drive genuine online activism and engagement. That made it much harder to separate them out from genuine users. It will continue to do so.
Identifying future foreign influence operations, and reducing their impact, will demand awareness and resilience from the activist communities targeted, not just the platforms and the open source community.